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Abstract
Infants extend their repertoire of behaviours from initially simple be-
haviours with single objects to complex behaviours dealing with spatial
relationships among objects. We are interested in the mechanisms under-
lying this development in order to achieve similar development in artificial
systems. One mechanism is sensorimotor differentiation, which allows one
behaviour to become altered in order to achieve a different result; the old
behaviour is not forgotten, so differentiation increases the number of avail-
able behaviours. Differentiation requires the learning of both sensory ab-
stractions and motor programs for the new behaviour; here we focus only
on the sensory aspect: learning to recognise situations in which the new
behaviour succeeds. We experimented with learning these situations in a
realistic physical simulation of a robotic manipulator interacting with var-
ious objects, where the sensor space includes the robot arm position data
and a Kinect-based vision system. The mechanism for learning sensory
abstractions for a new behaviour is a component in the larger enterprise
of building systems which emulate the mechanisms of infant development.
1 Introduction
In the period from six months of age through to two years, human infants
undergo significant development in their skills and understanding relat-
ing to physical world objects and their manipulation. At six months they
mostly deal with only one object at a time, performing simple actions such
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as sucking or banging; by two years they are capable of solving relatively
complex problems which require them to put multiple objects in a spatial
relationship, for example using simple tools. We are interested in building
artificial systems which could mimic the mechanisms underlying infants’
development of these skills and thereby achieve some understanding of the
physical world. In a survey of this development, we have outlined six of
these mechanisms [1], and the present paper (focussing on one mechanism)
is part of the endeavour to create a complete working implementation of
these mechanisms in an agent which could exhibit autonomous develop-
ment through embodiment in a robot.
Observations of infants show that, at any particular age, they possess
a repertoire of behaviours or manual skills which they apply to various
objects or surfaces they encounter [2, 3]. Each such behaviour could be
seen as roughly analogous to a planning operator in Artificial Intelligence,
because there are situations which make them likely to be executed (like
the precondition of a planning operator), and expected effects (postcon-
dition), as well as some motor control program describing the behaviour
executed. Piagetian theory calls such units schemas, and we use this
terminology here; other psychologists have similar units called “sensori-
motor processes” [4], “skills” [5], or “perception-action routines” [3]. The
repertoire of schemas which infants possess by two years is much larger
and more sophisticated than the repertoire they have at six months. The
focus of our work is on how new schemas are acquired. Within this prob-
lem there are the problems of identifying when a new schema should be
created, and then learning new precondition, postcondition, and motor
program for the new schema. In this paper, we focus on learning the
precondition for a new schema. This is a particularly interesting problem
in the case of “means-end behaviours”; these are problem solving situa-
tions where the infant cannot immediately achieve its goal, and so must
sequence two actions, where the first facilitates the next [6], for example
a toy may be obstructed by a box, and the infant may need to push the
box out of the way before being able to take possession of the toy. Figure
1 illustrates such a situation.
Figure 1: This figure on the left illustrates a situation where an infant desires
a toy which is obstructed by a box. The figure on the right shows the same
situation after the infant removed the box and is now able to retrieve the desired
toy.
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Piaget believed that it is through learning means-end behaviours that
infants begin to learn about important spatial relationships between ob-
jects [7]. The precondition of a schema (for a means-end behaviour) must
capture the spatial relationship between objects which determines where
the behaviour works or does not work. In learning preconditions the in-
fant is learning new important abstractions over its sensor space. This can
change how an infant understands a scene because the infant can begin to
see things at a higher level of abstraction, noticing precisely those spatial
relationships which are important in determining what object manipula-
tions are possible (by itself or other agents). This is an important part of
the development of an understanding of the world.
Both, sensory and motor aspects are crucial aspects of infancy and
ongoing development in general. These aspects are very much intertwined
in humans. In computational systems, sensory and motor aspects can also
influence and bootstrap each other; however, unlike biological systems,
artificial systems can choose to focus on either one independently. In this
work we focus on the sensory part, but we also investigate the motor side
in parallel in our research group.
DIFFERENTIATION
INITIAL SCHEMA NEW SCHEMA
Pulling the cloth/tray toexamine/touch/feel it. Pulling the cloth/tray inorder to get the keys
SENSORIMOTOR
Figure 2: This figure illustrates how a new behaviour can be acquired by the
differentiation mechanism. The original behaviour (initial schema) simply pulls
a cloth/tray in order to bring it close. The new behaviour pulls the cloth/tray
in order to bring the item supported by it closer. The new schema acquired will
need to adjust its motor behaviour, and also to learn the situations in which
this new behaviour can be expected to work.
In this work we experimented with the following two means-end be-
haviours: (i) pushing aside an obstacle to see if it would convert an ob-
structed scenario to and unobstructed one; (ii) pulling a supporting ob-
ject to bring the supported object into reach (i.e. to bring the object on
top into reach as in Fig. 2). In each case, we investigate how well we
can learn the preconditions describing the spatial relationship among a
pair of objects which determines whether or not the means-end behaviour
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will work. We did this using an agent which controls a simulated robot
arm with 6 Degrees of Freedom in a physically realistic 3D World, and a
Kinect-based vision system. For this vision system we also simulate the
Kinect, including the noise of real Kinect devices. Of course it would be
relatively easy for a programmer to simply code in the required spatial
relationship so that an agent would not have to learn it, however our aim
is to construct an agent which can learn world knowledge for itself. Such
an agent should hopefully be able to extend its own knowledge, and learn
things the designer might not have foreseen the need for. In particular we
would like to endow robots with the capability to learn about important
spatial relationships (determining the success of manipulation actions)
which the designer might not have foreseen the need for. Our analysis of
infant development (focussing on interaction with the physical world) [1]
suggests that infants do possess a differentiation mechanism for spawning
new schemas, and we see this capability as an essential component of any
agent which would be able to display ongoing autonomous development.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to build an arti-
ficial system to tackle the problem of the acquisition of preconditions for
the two means-end behaviours above (removing the obstacle, and pulling
the support). We believe that getting robots to do the kinds of tasks
which infants do is an important area in developmental robotics because
these are tasks which we know are part of a developing trajectory, leading
to more sophisticated tasks which build on them. Our results suggest
that (1) it is possible for a robotic system to autonomously learn its own
sensor abstractions for new behaviours, and (2) that rapid learning of
these abstractions can be facilitated if the agent adopts an active learning
approach to selecting new examples.
There is a closely related and recent work by Rosman and Ramamoor-
thy [8] which learns spatial relationships between objects, such as “on”
and “adjacent”. However this is learning the spatial relationships in a
human-supervised fashion, using humans to pre-label a set of scenes with
the object relations seen in the scene. We differ in the philosophy of our
approach because we believe that the robot should only learn relation-
ships which are practically meaningful for it (e.g. those relationships that
determine when a behaviour will be successful or not). In contrast to our
work, [8] imposes a concept (e.g. on top) which a human believes to be
useful for a robot, and the particular instantiation of that concept is de-
cided by the human, rather than with reference to the robot’s own action
in the world. We instead believe that the concepts which will be useful for
a robot are likely to be those that emerge from its own interactions with
the world. This is also related to Sutton’s “verification principle” [9, 10];
the relationship our system learns is grounded in its own experience, and
hence it can always revisit that and relearn it if necessary (e.g. if its ma-
nipulation ability changes, such that a different variant of the relationship
is needed now). In contrast, knowledge given by a human is not verifiable
by the agent, and is just given as is with no opportunity for adjusting the
idea. In our system training data can be gathered in an online fashion
as the robot executes actions and sees the effects, furthermore the rela-
tionships which the robot learns are not limited by those decided by a
human; whenever the robot needs to find situations in which a means-end
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behaviour works or does not, it can begin learning a classifier that will
appropriately discriminate the situations.
In Section II, we review the background literature on infants’ acquisi-
tion of means-end behaviours, to motivate our computational work. Sec-
tion III gives an overview of our computational work and the experiments
carried out. Section IV presents the results of our experiments. Section
V discusses the implications and significance of these results, and com-
pares with related works. Section VI concludes and outlines directions for
future work.
2 Motivation
Young infants start life with a limited set of repetitive behaviours, but
as they progress through the first two years their repertoire of behaviours
grows rapidly [1, 2]. The initial behaviours include “rhythmical stereo-
typical behaviours” which are either present at birth or seem to emerge as
by-products of the normal maturation of motor control circuits [11]. These
behaviours include “arm waving” (flapping of the arm vertically from the
shoulder), bending and extending the wrist, flexion and extension of the
fingers, etc. It is surmised that these behaviours may be opportunistically
used by infants for the purpose of bootstrapping further development, for
example by encouraging actions which will at some point lead to interest-
ing results. In addition to the rhythmical stereotypical behaviours, there
are the basic object behaviours such as looking at an object, and grasping
it, and performing basic actions such as mouthing it or banging it on a
surface. These behaviours are typically well established by six months
[12, p. 174],[13].
During the period from 6 to 24 months, there is a rapid growth in
the infant’s repertoire of behaviours. Following the terminology of Piaget
[14], we can describe these infant behaviours using the term schemas which
have roughly the same role as planning operators in typical AI systems.
A schema has a precondition (describing situations where it is expected to
be applicable), an action (or motor program), and a prediction (describing
the expected result). The growth in the infant’s behavioural repertoire
can then be described as the addition of new schemas to its repertoire.
The addition of schemas may be driven by some underlying developmen-
tal mechanisms [1], one of which is Sensorimotor differentiation: When
an existing schema is executed and it produces an unexpected result, this
can start a process which attempts to discover how to reproduce this new
result; the process must change both the old motor program as well as
the precondition and prediction of the old schema. Sensorimotor differen-
tiation thus describes how one schema can spawn a new schema.
An example of this process resulting in the emergence of a new schema
has been studied by Willatts [6], who studied the acquisition of the schema
for pulling a cloth in order to bring an object resting on it within reach
(where grabbing this object is the goal). Figure 2 illustrates this process.
Willatts showed that during the 6 to 8 months period there is a gradual
transition: initially the infant sees the goal (object out of reach) and
means (cloth), and does not know the possibility for retrieval, so the infant
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plays with the means object (cloth) for its own sake, but in grabbing the
cloth the object is brought closer. This accidental retrieval gradually
becomes intentional. Furthermore, by 9 months it was shown that infants
can adjust the means action (cloth pull) as appropriate to the goal, in
situations where the goal may be far or near. The new pulling behaviour
becomes quite different to the original retrieval behaviour; the cloth will be
pulled further, even behind the infant (this is the learning of a new motor
program); furthermore, the infant learns to discriminate the situations in
which this cloth pulling is likely to work (this is the learning of a new
sensor abstraction).
A further example which we have investigated concerns removing an
obstacle (see also Piaget [2]): A young infant has a behaviour for waving
an object back and forth on a table surface. At some later point, this
behaviour becomes differentiated to produce a behaviour for deliberately
displacing an object to one side in order to retrieve a visible toy behind
it (see Figure 1). Again, the new behaviour is different as it becomes
tailored to the new goal, and the situations where it is likely to work are
learnt.
Piaget believed that it is through learning means-end behaviours such
as these that infants begin to learn about important spatial relationships
between objects [7]. This is an important part of the development of an
understanding of the world because it helps an infant to understand what
it observes at a higher level of abstraction, noticing precisely those spatial
relationships which are important in determining what object manipula-
tions are possible (by itself or other agents). The importance of these
acquisitions for cognitive development motivates our interest in attempt-
ing to build artificial systems which could autonomously make similar
acquisitions.
3 System Overview
This section first briefly describes how the system detailed in this paper
fits into the larger enterprise of building artificial systems which acquire
new behaviours following a similar developmental trajectory to infants
(Sec. 3.1). Following this we detail our simulated robotic arm, vision sys-
tem, and experimental setup (Sec. 3.2, 3.3), followed by the experiments
run and the learning approach used (Sec. 3.4).
3.1 Overview of the Developing System
The work reported in this paper is just one component in our developing
system, which includes mechanisms of development allowing new senso-
rimotor schemas to be added to the infant’s repertoire. We will give a
brief overview in order to illustrate where the precondition learning fits
into the full system. We first explain some terms: an “action” in our
system is a skilled motor program which typically achieves some goal, for
example, reaching for and picking up any of various objects, or pulling an
object. A “relationship” between objects in this paper refers to a spatial
arrangement of the objects; in particular we focus on the spatial rela-
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tionship of one being on-top of the other such that pulling the lower one
will make the upper one also move. Note that we are not interested in
the concept “on top” as a human adult might think of it, rather we are
interested in the spatial relationship which exists if the two objects are to
move together, so it is a very practical relationship which is grounded in a
particular manipulation action. In our system a schema 〈prec,M , pred ,G〉
has a precondition prec, a motor program M , a prediction pred , and also a
postcondition G (which can be viewed as the goal this individual schema
is trying to achieve). A postcondition (or goal) is necessary so that some
schemas know when to terminate, and also because new schemas typically
start life with a new goal and have to tailor their motor and sensor aspects
to appropriately serve the goal. On a higher level in the framework, these
schemas can be used and put into a sequence by a planner in order to
achieve complex high-level goals. When considering such a sequence of
planned actions, we would refer to the “goal” of an individual schema as a
“subgoal”. The motor program controls the robot arm to achieve this sub-
goal. The simulated infant maintains a library of schemas some of which
are provided initially, and some of which may subsequently be added to or
modified. The initial schemas include behaviours such as look-at, reach,
grasp, drop, etc. This is not to suggest that these behaviours are innate in
infants, they are just starting behaviours for our system; we do not want
our system to have to learn everything which an infant learns, instead we
want it to start at a state with some competences/behaviours and then
learn from there.
The agent analyses the current state of the world and produces a plan-
ning tree of future possibilities for its own actions; this tree is currently
limited to a depth of three, but in the future this could be changed to a
more dynamic depth based on the accuracies of the schema predictions.
The planning tree shows possible chains of actions. To find these, when
analysing the current state, the agent checks for each available schema
whether its precondition is met, i.e. whether it is expected to achieve its
goal when executed in the current state, and adds it to the tree if it is
expected to be successful. The agent then uses a schema’s predictor to
predict the next state of each added schema and adds a second layer of ac-
tions by analysing the predicted states. This is repeated until the depth
limit is reached. The first level of the tree now contains every schema
whose precondition is satisfied currently; the second level contains every
schema which is predicted to be executable thereafter, and so on.
The agent, hence, understands the scene in terms of possibilities with
regard to existing schemas. Figure 3 illustrates the routine the agent
continuously loops through:
1. Computing the tree of executable schemas, where executable means
they are expected to have a chance to achieve their goal.
2. Selecting one of the first level schemas for execution, where this selec-
tion can be random or guided by intrinsic motivation or a planning
algorithm trying to achieve a not directly achievable goal.
3. Updating the agent’s knowledge based on the results of that execu-
tion (which may include the harvesting of a new schema).
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If the result of the execution is a slight variation on the predicted re-
sult (slight here means that the subsequent possibilities in the tree are not
affected by this change), then the prediction of that schema is updated.
However, if the result of the execution causes an unexpected change in
the tree, i.e., changes the future schema execution possibilities, then a
harvesting process is initiated which creates a new schema (the term ‘har-
vesting’ is borrowed from Chaput [15]). This can be illustrated with the
example of the support: before the system knows about the means-end
behaviour of the support it may accidentally pull a supporting object and
thereby cause a formerly unreachable object to come into reach. This will
cause an unexpected change in the tree, because there is now a new object
in reach on which various actions (such as grasping) could be performed.
hence, the criterion for harvesting has been met. A preliminary version
of this model has been made in a masters thesis [16].
Harvesting is the first step in differentiation: it creates a copy of the
schema which had just been executed, but gives it a different goal (to
achieve the unexpected result). A goal can be to bring about a certain
(set of) feature(s) in the state space, e.g. to touch or grasp an object. A
more difficult goal would be to enable another schema, e.g. a goal could
be to make an object reachable (which is the case in the harvesting of
a schema for the support means-end behaviour). The old schema gets
assigned the goal to achieve the previous standard outcome. Based on
the new goal, the new schema then tries to modify its precondition so as
to capture the situations in which the new goals can be reliably achieved;
this is the differentiation of the precondition which is the focus of this
paper. The motor program and prediction also need to be differentiated
(but this is not tackled in this paper). For learning the motor program,
the concept of Goal Babbling [17] may be useful as it allows for a limited
type of exploration of motor programs, which is directed towards goals.
In the current work, we focus on improving and evaluating this pro-
cess of adjusting the precondition of the new schema based on ongoing
experiences generated from its execution. The problem of deciding when
to create the new schema was found to be the easier part in our previous
work, and is not addressed here.
3.2 The Simulated Environment
As our robot we use a simulated 6 degrees of freedom arm mounted on a
table with a two finger gripper as its hand in the simulator RobWorkSim
[18, 19]. In our experiment, we use 3 different household objects (see Fig.
4):
1. A simple coffee cup
2. A cereal Box
3. A tray (with a protrusion to facilitate pulling)
Our agent senses its internal state such as robot arm joint angles and
calculates the position and orientation of its hand based on the joint
angles. The full state space consists of this internal state space and the
external statespace describing the world the robot is situated in.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the routine the agent continuously loops through: I)
Based on the current state of the environment, the agent constructs a tree of
possible actions II) The agent selects a schema for execution III) The agent
executes the selected schema IV) The harvester module decides whether or not
to create a new schema, based on the result of the last execution V) If a new
schema was created it is added to the agent’s schema library
The internal state space has 13 Dimensions. The first 6 variables de-
scribe the joint angles of the robot arm. The second 6 variables describe
the position and orientation of the hand of the robot arm. These 6 vari-
ables consist of 3 variables for the Cartesian position and 3 variables for
the orientation of the hand in Roll, Pitch and Yaw values. The second 6
variables are calculated from the first 6 values. The last variable in the
internal state space equates to the openness of the hand’s fingers. Figure
4 shows this state space.
In our experiments, we first learnt preconditions using object position
data directly from the RobWork simulator (i.e. perfectly accurate data),
then we later used the less perfect data coming from our vision system, to
see how well the learning system would cope with a more realistic noisy
input.
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Arm Joint angles:
Q0: 10.890
Q1: -111.960
Q2: -58.320
Q3: -102.330
Q4: 88.560
Q5: 17.280
Finger Distance: 
0.002
Object ID: 1 (Cup)
X:   0.652  Y:   -0.00217  Z:   0.313
RwX: 0.666  RwY:  0.00258  RwZ: 0.269
Roll: 90.4  Pitch: -0.031  Yaw: -75.5
RwRoll:131  RwPitch:-15.3  RwYaw: 107
Object ID: 2 (Box)
X:   0.679  Y:    0.0701   Z:  0.0825
RwX: 0.655  RwY:   0.101   RwZ:0.0391
Roll:  -148 Pitch: -84.2   Yaw:   167
Object ID: 3 (Tray)
X:   0.750  Y:    -0.285   Z:   0.0240
RwX: 0.728  RwY:  -0.285   RwZ:-0.0153
Roll:0.192  Pitch:-0.0702  Yaw:   -179
RwRoll:-88  RwPitch:0.00629 RwYaw:90.0
RwRoll:-161 RwPitch:16.0   RwYaw:90.6
Figure 4: Illustration of the simulated world (screenshot on the left) containing
the robot arm and the 3 household items used in experiments (Cup, Cereal
Box and Tray); the camera is positioned to the left of this image, producing
the texlets which can be seen in the rightmost screenshot above. The adjoined
text shows the complete state space of the robotic system. Values prefixed with
“Rw”, such as “RwX” come direct from RobWorkSim, whereas values such as
“X” are the result of the vision system operating on the texlets.
3.3 The (Simulated) Vision System
Our robotic system uses a Kinect-based vision system [20] developed at
SDU, to extract information about objects in the scene.
A Kinect is a 3D scanner camera system developed by Microsoft as
motion sensing input device for the Microsoft game console Xbox 360. It
is a popular alternative to expensive stereo camera systems and provides
good results in close range applications with up to 3 meters distance from
the Kinect device [21].
The Kinect system projects an infrared image (invisible for human
eyes) over the scene and then takes a picture of the scene. Using its
knowledge of the projected infrared image it is able to calculate an accu-
rate depth map based on the distortion of the infrared image. This depth
map describes the distance from the camera of each point of the surfaces
visible to the camera system. Using the picture of the scene and the
depth map, our vision system calculates a 3D point cloud as it is common
amongst state of the art vision systems[22].
Based on this 3D point cloud and the colour information of the scene,
our vision system creates surface patches as shown in Figure 4 on the right
hand side. There are different layers of surface patches. We only use basic
layer with surface patches which we call texlets. These texlets describe
the surface of the scene with additional information, e.g. not only position
in the space, but also the orientation and colour of the surface [23].
Because we worked with a simulator, we also simulate the Kinect sys-
tem, and included the noise of real Kinect devices. This gives us data
about the depth to the objects in our 3D scene just as we would have
obtained from a real Kinect looking at a real scene with 3D objects. The
data from the simulated vision system is hence more noisy and less accu-
rate than the perfectly accurate data provided by taking the locations of
objects directly from the simulator.
Using different coloured objects for segmentation purposes, the vision
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system is able to recognise up to five objects and extract their centre of
gravity positions in relation to the robot arm, and their orientation. This
is achieved by running PCA over each object’s texlet-based representation.
Both, position and orientation of an object are described by 3 variables
each. These variables are X, Y and Z for the position and Roll, Pitch
and Yaw for the orientation in space. Together with the 13 internal state
variables described above in Section 3.2, this gives a 43 Dimensional state
space, where the 13 internal state variables describe the robot itself and
the 5 * 6 = 30 external state variables describe the configuration of the
objects in the robots view.
Note that none of the values returned by the vision system is perfectly
accurate. Centre of gravity is approximate, and orientation works best
for a long object, but does not give much useful information for a small
roundish object like a cup. The difference between the state space based
on perfect RobWork data and the imperfect Vision System data can be
clearly seen in Fig. 4 (by comparing a value with its corresponding “Rw”
value written directly below it). In the remainder of this paper, when
talking about “RobWork data”, we mean the state space based on the
perfect information provided by the simulator and similarly, with “vision
based data” we mean the state space which is based on the data provided
by the noisy Vision system. Part of the challenge of learning preconditions
is to work with this imperfect data.
3.4 Experiments
3.4.1 Example 1: The Support
Our first example is where the robot pulls the tray (means action) in order
to bring an object supported by it (in this case the cup) into reach (goal).
In some cases this will not work, because the cup (or whatever supported
object is desired) might not be fully on the tray. The learner’s task is
to recognise the situations where the means action is effective. Figure 5
illustrates a scene where the desired cup is initially out of reach, but the
robot successfully brings it into reach by pulling closer the support on
wich the cup is standing. The robot then can successfully grasp the cup.
3.4.2 Example 2: The Obstruction
In “the obstruction” scenario there are two objects in the scene; the cereal
box and the cup. The cup is the object that the agent wants to grasp, but
the cereal box is obstructing the reach (but not the view). The desired
object is therefore not reachable. In specific situations, e.g. as illustrated
in Figure 6, pushing one object sideways (the box) may render the other
object (the cup) graspable. The learner’s task here is to recognise situa-
tions where pushing the obstruction sideways will allow the desired object
to be grasped.
3.4.3 Pretraining the preconditions of schemas
Before learning the above preconditions, we need to endow the system
with some initial schemas. These preliminary schemas are essential be-
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Figure 5: This figure illustrates how the robot brings into reach the initially out
of reach cup by pulling closer the tray on which the cup is standing.
cause, for example, if one considers the task of gathering training data for
recognising the support situation, the system needs to pull the support,
and the resulting situation needs to be labelled; i.e. we need to know if the
desired object was reachable after pulling the support; hence the reachable
precondition needs to be learnt first. The motor programs of these initial
schemas were handcoded, while the pre- and postcondition were trained.
These initial schemas are purely for single actions and are not trained
with any knowledge of their applicability in means-end combinations.
We did this for three schemas:
(1) Grasp(o): reaching and grasping an object o when unobstructed (e.g.
the cup),
(2) Push(o): reaching and pushing an object o (e.g. the box),
(3) Pull(o): reaching and pulling an object o (e.g. the tray),
where o is a parameter for the object.
We also trained one handmade abstraction to recognise “the obstruc-
tion”; this recognises if one object is obstructed by another (e.g. the cup
obstructed by the cereal box). The three schemas were trained by trying
out each schema on a set of randomised environments.
The Grasp(Cup) schema precondition was trained on 3000 training
examples out of which 1500 were successful reaches for the cup and 1500
were unsuccessful reaches. The trained schema precondition was tested on
a validation set with 7862 examples (3931 successful/3931 unsuccessful).
On this validation set the schema precondition achieved a classification
success of 99.16% correct classifications using the RobWork data for train-
ing. Using Vision based data for learning the classification success was
99.13% correct classifications.
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Figure 6: Illustration of one object (box) obstructing another (cup)
The Push(Box) schema precondition was trained on 2200 training ex-
amples (1642 successful/558 unsuccessful). The validation set contained
376 examples (284/92). On this validation set the schema precondition
achieved a classification success of 89.63%. Push(Box) was only trained
with RobWork data. The relatively low performance is due to fewer train-
ing examples.
The Pull(Tray) schema precondition was trained on 3000 training ex-
amples (1500/1500). The validation set contained 4380 examples (2190/2190).
On this validation set the schema precondition achieved a classification
success of 92.51% correct classifications using the RobWork data for train-
ing. Using Vision based data for learning the classification success was
91.69% correct classifications. Note that this is merely recognising situa-
tions where the tray can be pulled, and says nothing about the means-end
behaviour of “the support”.
The obstruction recognising abstraction succeeded in about 93% of its
classification trials. It was trained on 5879 examples (3329/2550) and
tested against 997 examples (898/99). Again, this was only done with
RobWork data, not Vision based data.
All Precondition classifiers and abstraction recognisers were trained
using simple feed forward Neural Networks. They all had 6 input neurons
and one hidden layer with 10 Neurons. The output layer was a single
Neuron which was trained to output either 0 or 1 for predicted fail/success
accordingly. The neurons used Sigmoidal activation functions and the
training algorithm used was RPROP using cross entropy error instead of
the usual root mean squared error.
3.4.4 Generating Data and Training
Experiment 1 is with the support: We generated 6,453 positions for sup-
port and cup, and then pulled the support to see if the cup would come
into reach. The outcome was that 83% of examples were negative (the
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cup did not come into reach), and 17% positive.
Experiment 2 is with obstructed scenarios: We generated 16,361 sce-
narios with random positions for the cup and box, and then pushed the
box (obstacle) to see if it would convert an obstructed scenario to and
unobstructed one. The outcome was that 94% of examples were negative
(the cup was still unattainable after executing the push action), and 6%
positive. This is probably qualitatively in line with typical real-world ex-
periences, in that positive examples of configurations where the pushing
of one object makes another accessible are relatively rare, for everyday
toys and household objects in everyday spatial relationships.
Using this labelled data, we trained classifiers to predict situations
where a “remove obstruction” or “pull support” means-end behaviour
would work. The support classifier was separately trained twice (to com-
pare results): once with the direct RobWork data for object position and
orientation, and once using the Vision System’s data. In the experiments
with RobWork data, the preconditions (for such things as “reachable”,
see Sec. 3.4.3) learnt from RobWork data were used. For the experiments
with vision data, the preconditions learnt from vision data were used.
The obstruction classifier was only trained on direct RobWork data. We
initially experimented with both logistic regression and neural networks
for classification. The neural networks proved to be vastly superior and
so we did not produce graphs for the logistic regression with all differ-
ent training schedules. (The advantage of logistic regression is speed of
training.)
We experimented with a range of networks and determined that a
single hidden layer of 9 nodes was optimal. The training algorithm was
RPROP [24, 25]. A validation set of 4380 examples (50% positive, 50%
negative) was randomly selected. Existing work [26] shows that learning
can be problematic when negative examples greatly outnumber positives;
for this reason we also randomly selected a balanced set (50% positive,
50% negative) of training examples from the entire data.
3.5 Certainty Based Curiosity
The problem of learning of preconditions grows in difficulty with the size of
the state space; hence it is of considerable difficulty in our 3D world with
a 6 DOF arm. Given a very large set of training data, the determination
of the precondition might be facilitated, but infants seem to learn from
relatively few examples. For this reason we have looked at techniques
which the program can use to select the training data which might be most
useful. It does seem likely that infants use a similar technique because they
do not select actions at random, but rather have some intrinsic motivations
to prefer certain actions in certain situations.
Certainty Based Curiosity [27] is a strategy to bootstrap the learning
process so that schema precondition and prediction performances con-
verge faster to their maxima. This bootstrapping is achieved by trying to
perform the schema which is most likely to benefit from the experience.
In every state each schema’s precondition returns a value between 0 and
1. A 0 corresponds to the class “failure” where the schema is expected to
be unable to achieve its goal when executed in the current state. A 1 cor-
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responds to the class “success” where the schema is expected to achieve
its goal when executed in the current state. Thus, the precondition imple-
ments a standard classifier, in this case with Sigmodial output between 0
and 1. If the output of the precondition classifier lies close to 0 or 1, then
the classifier seems to be certain about the outcome. E.g. 0.01 means
there is no point in even trying and 0.99 means it will almost certainly
work. If, however, the classifier output lies close to 0.5, then the classifier
is not sure about the outcome. In fact, a output of exactly 0.5 means
there is a 50% chance for either outcome, failure or success. This means
the classifier is unable to predict the schema’s failure or success with any
confidence in the current state. In this case executing the schema is likely
to generate experience which the classifier will benefit from.
Training examples were processed in batches of ten; i.e. each schedule
trained with ten random examples initially, and thereafter made its selec-
tion for the next ten based on its current classifier filtering the remaining
examples. The network was trained on the examples according to the
following schedules:
• Random: random selection of next samples.
• CBC (Certainty Based Curiosity): select the training examples whose
current predicted classification lies in the range 0.3 to 0.7 (i.e. un-
certain classification). If no training examples remain in this range
a random selection is made.
• Ranked CBC: Sort all remaining samples according to how close
their classification is to 0.5, and pick the next samples from the top
(closest to 0.5) of the list.
• 0.2 epsilon greedy CBC: similar to ranked, but with 0.2 percent
chance to pick a random sample. (0.2 was picked because in previous
tests [27] this had given the best results.)
In each case an average was run over 50 complete trials (with different
randomly initialised neural networks) to smooth results.
The idea behind the Certainty Based Curiosity approach to action
selection would mean that we should place the agent in random situations
and let it choose its actions guided by Certainty Based Curiosity (CBC).
However in our work we have simply gathered all the training in advance
from a random distribution of positions, and the CBC’s role is to select
the most “interesting” examples at each iteration of training. We expect
to see that in the CBC guided runs the schemas converge to their best
performance faster than in random walk runs. This was our hypothesis
in advance of running the experiments; the actual results are described in
the next subsection.
4 Results
Firstly we were able to learn the precondition of schemas (see Fig. 8). For
the simpler schemas the precondition’s accuracy approached 99%. For the
more complex newly acquired means-end schema of bringing the cup into
reach, the precondition’s accuracy approached 81%. The support is a
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very difficult spatial relationship to learn (which is also true for infants
[7]). The left image in Figure 7 shows an example of a scene which the
precondition successfully learned to classify as a state in which pulling the
support will bring the cup into reach. The right image in Figure 7 shows
an example of a scene which the precondition successfully classified as a
state in which this will not work.
Figure 7: This figure illustrates two different cases where the precondition was
successfully trained to predict whether pulling the support will bring the cup
into reach. For the scene in the left image it learned that it is possible, for the
scene in the right image it learned that it is not possible.
Using the realistic Vision based data to learn the precondition we were
able to achieve similar accuracy as with the perfect noise-free RobWork
Simulator data. Fig. 8 compares the performance of RobWork based
learning with Vision based learning for three schemas: Grasp Cup, Pull
Support and Pull Support to bring the cup into reach. However it is worth
noting that the direct RobWork based learning achieved high accuracy
much faster than the Vision based learning, as can be seen by comparing
Fig. 10 and Fig. 12, which are showing the same learning problem with
the only difference being that Fig. 10 uses the vision system.
Secondly we looked at the influence of the different schedules by which
training examples are selected on the learning rates of learning the precon-
ditions. Figure 9 shows pulling the support and Figure 10 shows pulling
the support to bring the cup into reach. The preconditions are first learnt
with 10 random samples (which gives a performance little better than
chance (50%)). The set of training samples is then step by step increased
by 10 samples, using one of the different selection schedules described in
Sec. 3.5, and used for relearning the precondition.
The graphs show that learning preconditions with reasonable accuracy
is possible from a moderate amount of training data (e.g. 500 samples).
The graphs also show that learning from random samples performs better
than using more directed schedules. These results are unexpected as we
showed that directed schedules can perform better than random in a pre-
vious publication [27]. Figures 11 and 12 show how a directed schedule
outperformed “random” in our previous experiments for two means-end
schemas: Pull support to bring cup into reach and push a cereal box away
to unobstruct the cup. The discrepancy is probably due to the higher
noise in the data of the experiments using the vision system. Ka¨a¨ria¨inen
[28] showed that any active learner has a lower bound of Ω〈 η2
2
〉 on the
sample complexity. The Ω-notation [29] is related to the more commonly
16
Figure 8: The Graph shows the accuracies of the preconditions for the three
schemas Grasp Cup, Pull Support and bringing the cup into reach. It can be
seen that Vision based learning performs almost as well as the RobWork based
learning. 3000 training samples were used.
used O-notation, but where the O-notation describes an upper bound, the
Ω-notation describes an lower bound (i.e. the best case when it comes to
the sample complexity in active learning). The noise in the data is rep-
resented by η and  describes the classification error. This means when η
is large active learning can not outperform random sampling. In fact, the
opposite can be the case. This is, because the most informative samples
active learning is trying to find, also tend to be the most noise-prone [30].
That means that the learning algorithm has to use very noisy samples for
learning and cannot even rely on the less informative but also less noisy
samples from further away from the decision boundary which a random
sampling would provide. This explains why the random sampling out-
performs the directed sampling when using the noisy vision based data.
Selecting more noisy samples would lead to worsening performance for the
classifier.
5 Discussion
We have shown that learning preconditions for schemas is possible with
reasonable accuracy using a few hundred training examples. We also show
that with many thousands of experiences, it is possible to learn precon-
ditions with very high accuracy. In order to try to reduce the number of
training samples required we experimented with different active learning
strategies for choosing the next training samples. Previous results using
data directly from the simulator suggested that using a directed schedule
produced faster learning. However, our results here using the vision sys-
tem within the simulator suggest that schedule where the learner chooses
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Figure 9: Learning Rates of different sample picking schedules for pulling the
tray, using input data from the computer vision system. The different schedules
for the four graphs are described in Section 3.5. Precondition accuracy is on
the y-axis and number of samples on the x-axis.
randomly from the set of available experiences produces marginally better
results than a directed schedule. This disparity in results is probably due
to the high degree of noise within the vision data.
We are interested to discuss here the similarities and differences be-
tween what our system learns and what infants learn in the 6 to 11 months
period. However, we first must point out that we are not attempting to
create a model of an infant with our work. Our computational system
is significantly simpler than an infant, and even if some correspondence
might be achieved in what they learn, this would in no way imply that
there was a correspondence in the implementation. We do not believe
it would be fruitful to “replicate” the detail of the results of an infant
study by building a computational system which could produce similar
data points to that produced by the infants, because the implementations
would be so different that the computational model would shed no light
on how infants operate. However we are interested in copying the devel-
opmental trajectory of infants, and tackling similar problems in a similar
ordering to infants, because we believe that infant developmental trajec-
tories can give a useful ordering of tasks and competences from easy to
hard, where subsequent ones build on previous acquisitions.
Now we compare what our system learns and what infants learn in the
6 to 11 months period. One point worth noting is that there have been
only a handful of systematic studies analysing how infants acquire the
means-end behaviours for the support or obstruction scenarios. While
we have some studies which probe the competence at a particular age
[31, 32, 33], Willatts’s [6] goes further and tracks the change during the
period of transition; he studied the acquisition of the support over the
6 to 8 months period, and analysed eye-gaze (to determine if the infant
intentionally pulled the support in order to retrieve the supported object,
or just to play with the support). This showed that accidental retrieval
gradually becomes intentional. However, there are still a lot of unknowns
about the infant’s progression; e.g. it would be beneficial for a roboticist
18
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Figure 10: Learning Rates of different sample picking schedules for pulling the
tray with a cup on top, in order to bring the cup into reach, using input data
from the computer vision system. The different schedules for the four graphs
are described in Section 3.5. Precondition accuracy is on the y-axis and number
of samples on the x-axis.
to see a systematic study of the situations where the infant classifies cor-
rectly or incorrectly, right up to 11 months. Such studies are not easy
to carry out as one needs a lot of access to the infants to test them very
frequently. We are left then with studies which are more anecdotal than
systematic, such as Piaget’s [2, 7]. In general these show that infants
learn fairly rapidly from a few examples, although the studies have not
monitored every waking hour of the infants, so we do not know how many
examples they try while nobody is looking. Notwithstanding this we can
point out some definite major differences between our learning and infants:
infants have some complex background knowledge which they apply to
this problem, largely present as early perceptual competences [34]. There
are many potentially useful abstractions in perception which the infant
may be using, such as paying particular attention to edges of objects, or
the area between two objects. Infants may also have biases to give pri-
ority to certain information when learning about causality for example.
In addition there are numerous potential sources of knowledge which the
infant could be bringing to bear on the problem of understanding when
the support works or not; e.g. the infant has prior experience of pushing
objects on surfaces and feeling the frictional resistance [13], the infant
has prior knowledge of how inanimate objects are not supposed to move
unless caused to move by some contact [35], the infant has experinece of
gravity and how one object presses on the object underneath. We are
not sure if any of these sources are in fact used by the infant learning the
support, but they are available. Our artificial system by comparison is
very ignorant about the world, and is learning with very little background
knowledge, apart from its ability to segment objects and analyse rela-
tionships between the information extracted about distinct objects. Our
system is learning purely from this fairly low level perceptual data; this
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Figure 11: Learning Rates of E-Greedy and Random sample picking in the
Unobstruct Cup Case using perfect input data direct from the simulator (i.e.
no computer vision system).
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Figure 12: Learning Rates of E-Greedy and Random sample picking in the Pull
Support Case using perfect input data direct from the simulator (i.e. not using
computer vision system); note that this is the same graph as Fig. 10 except this
one does not use the vision system.
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perceptual data is more limited than what the infant has, and the infant
additionally has more sources of other information tht it might potentially
use. This would explain why infants could learn with fewer examples.
Theoretically we can also discuss the relationship between our “dif-
ferentiation” and Piagetian assimilation and accommodation. In Piaget’s
accounts [2, 7] most phenomena in infancy involve elements of assimilation
and elements of accommodation (rarely is something pure assimilation or
pure accommodation), and differentiation is no different. These two pro-
cesses will apply to the motor part as well as the sensory part (precondi-
tion) of the schema, although the present paper has only focussed on the
sensory part. When a schema is about to be differentiated, such as the
schema for pulling being differentiated to “pull support”, there is initially
assimilation because the new phenomenon is seen as similar to the be-
haviour of pulling, and so the pulling schema is used as a basis for the new
schema. There is also an element of accommodation because it is recog-
nised that the schema needs to be adjusted (accommodation); this adjust-
ment (accommodation) happens over a longer timescale than the original
assimilation, because extensive training data needs to be gathered about
support relationships before an accurate classifier can be trained. Overall
accommodation is the dominant process in differentiation, because it is
essentially a change to a cognitive structure, however the initial assimila-
tion to some schema which will act as a basis is also crucial. This is a little
different to some other descriptions of assimilation and accommodation in
computational works. Some neural network models interpret assimilation
as the changing of weights in the network whereas accommodation is used
for changes to the architecture (e.g. new connections) [36]. We find this
interpretation a little too narrow, as Piaget’s notion assimilation would
seem to apply even if weights are not changed and a network can be used
“as is” to classify; also Piaget’s notion of accommodation would seem to
apply where any change is made, and changing the weights in a network
can lead to radical changes in what it would recognise. An example closer
to ours is the reinforcement learning system of Tommasino, et al. [37].
They also clearly separate the two processes and use assimilation to apply
to the case where an existing expert can be used “as is”, whereas they
use the term accommodation where an expert with similar sensorimotor
mappings is used as a basis and then modified. Under our interpretation
we would say that the latter case has an element of assimilation because
of the choice of an expert with similar sensorimotor mappings; ultimately
this comes down to how people interpret Piaget’s writings and what he
meant with these two terms; this issue of varying interpretations is also
mentioned in the same paper by Tommasino, et al. [37]. The idea of
building a library of schemas (or re-using existing “experts”) also entails
a number of interesting problems related to assimilation and accommoda-
tion which we have not addressed here, for example how should the choice
be made between adjusting an existing skill or creating a new one? How
can the context be used to decide which new situations can be tackled by
existing skills? (See also [38]).
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5.1 Comparison with related work
Apart from the work of Rosman and Ramamoorthy [8] which we discussed
in the introduction, we have not found a related work with which we
can make a direct comparison, however several works are less directly
related. Our work could be described as autonomously learning planning
operators, for which there is some related work in AI [39, 40, 15, 41];
Chaput [15] learns new operators via a self-organising map which looks at
vectors of all sensor values before and after an action; this was effective
in the scenario they used with a small number of binary sensors, but
it would not easily scale to larger state spaces. The work of Mourao
et al. [41] learns action effects for a robot manipulation scenario. The
sensor abstractions are provided (e.g. predicates such as “object x is
in object y”) and the system learns which predicates become true after
the action is performed. Their predicates are predefined whereas in our
work we want the state space to develop over time, so that the agent
effectively invents new predicates (such as the spatial relationship defining
the support relation). Mugan and Kuipers’ work [40] is somewhat close in
that they do not need to predefine predicates and can autonomously find
regions within variables; however compared to this we need the ability
to learn a wider class of possible preconditions, for example those that
involve relationships among variables.
Work on learning “affordances” is quite close to ours; Ugur et al.
[42] learns affordance predictors for behaviours by learning the mapping
from the object features to discovered object effect categories. These
predictors can then be used by an agent to make plans to achieve desired
goals. This work is quite similar to ours in that essentially it boils down
to classification; i.e. once effect categories have been clustered Ugur et
al. use a classifier to learn the mapping from the initial object features
to these effects. They use SVMs where we use neural networks. At a
conceptual level a difference in the approaches concerns what drives the
learning of a classifier. In Ugur et al.’s work the decision about what
effects a classifier should be learned for is dictated by the choice of features
which the agent has been given as its perceptual world. In our work the
decision about which action effects to learn a precondition for is dictated
by whether those action effects facilitate other subsequent actions which
were previously impossible. We would speculate that it is likely that
infants combine both approaches.
One major claim we can make for our work relative to others reviewed
is that it seems to be one of the few works which tackles these specific
actual early infant means-end behaviours; i.e. the first means-end be-
haviours that infants acquire in the second half of the first year. We are
not aware of any other developmental robotics work which tackles the ac-
quisition of the support for example. Some of the works reviewed above
tackle domains far removed from infancy (e.g. Chaput’s forager [15]) or
tasks more advanced than what infants engage in the first year [41]. As
stated in the introduction, we believe that the acquisition of early means-
end behaviours is of major importance to cognitive development because
it is through these that infants begin to gain a higher level understanding
of the world, in this case by beginning to take notice of important spatial
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relationships between objects, which determine how they might behave
under manipulation. More generally we believe that the tasks, and order-
ing, present in early infancy could be quite advantageous to follow because
it leads through a developmental trajectory from easy to difficult, with
later acquisitions building on earlier ones.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we have looked at the problem of learning the precondi-
tion (and making it more accurate) for a newly discovered means-end
behaviour. We have shown that learning these preconditions accurately
takes rather a lot of training data, especially when realistic visual input is
used. When using the data form our (noisy) vision system we have shown
a slight advantage to selecting training examples randomly rather than by
an active learning strategy (which contradicted our previous results using
noiseless data direct from the simulator). It could be expected that using
more detailed and accurate vision information (not just the position and
orientation) may well reduce the noise and make an active strategy more
appropriate.
Our approach is quite naive in that it looks at rather crude param-
eters extracted from the visual data, such as position and orientation,
which lose most of the detail of the surfaces of the objects involved and
their spatial relationships. In future work we intend to make use of more
detailed visual data so as to enable the system to more accurately learn
the precise spatial relationships between objects which determine the suc-
cess of various means-end actions which require objects to be in special
relationships (which is very relevant to tool use for example).
In future work we would also like to collaborate with psychologists
studying infants to learn more about the order in which infants acquire
various stages of competence in their learning of the support and other
means-end behaviours. For example, we know from Uzgiris and Hunt’s
studies that although an 8 month-old can successfully pull a support (as
a means to retrieve an object), the necessary spatial relationship (on top
of) is not understood, and up until 10 months or later the infant will still
pull a support even if the desired object is held above it and not touching
it [31, p.111], or resting on an object close to the support. We would
like to see a rigorous testing of a wide variety of borderline support cases
to determine where infants misclassify the support relationship, and how
this changes from 8 to 11 months.
Another aspect to consider is the different sources of knowledge and
the order in which infants develop skills for successfully using a tool such
as the support, and develop their perceptual skills for recognising the
causal relationship when they see it used by someone else. Schlesinger
and Langer’s results show that causal perception develops later than the
(action) skill for using the support [33]. If developing robots are to fol-
low the trajectory of infant development this suggests that the emphasis
should be firstly on their own exploratory actions with the tool, rather
than learning purely from observation. However Schlesinger and Langer
think it unlikely that causal activity is the only determinant in the de-
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velopment of infants causal perception, and further research could help
to elucidate the potential contributions of other sources of knowledge.
For example linguistic sources of knowledge may also be important. It
is claimed that language input may influence category formation as early
as 3 months [43], however it is not clear at what age language influences
the formation of concepts of spatial relationships such as those dealt with
in this paper. Research has shown that 5-month-old infants’ categori-
sation of spatial relationships was not influenced by the language they
were exposed to, but by adulthood the extent to which their native lan-
guage marked these spatial relationships altered their sensitivity to these
concepts [44]. It remains unclear at what age the language began to in-
fluence the developing spatial relationship concepts. Casasola showed the
influence of language on 18-month-olds learning to categorise the support
relationship [45]; interestingly her study showed that 18-month-olds failed
to categorise support situations, which is surprising given that they would
by this time have spent more than half their lives knowing how to use a
support in a means-end activity; it suggests that when the context of the
task is different infants do not necessarily draw on the knowledge they
might have available in another context (i.e. the context of acting to
achieve a goal). Other studies examining how linguistic terms for spa-
tial relationships are learned have also shown the difficulty of transferring
what is learned in one context to another; they have shown that experience
of concrete interactions with the objects facilitate the learning, and also
that abstract artificial objects provide situations in infants learn poorly,
instead infants require objects with functionally relevant properties [46].
In summary significant further research would be required to elucidate
the contributions of all the potential sources of information that an infant
might use to learn a spatial relationship, and the additional difficulties
provided by varying contextual aspects.
If we step back from the details and look at how the problem tack-
led here fits into the big picture of the mechanisms of development, we
see that finding preconditions is one way to find new abstractions over
states. The preconditions of means-end behaviours are particularly inter-
esting because they tend to capture spatial relationships among objects
(e.g. the means object and the goal object). It is conceivable that sensory
abstractions discovered in this way could subsequently be used to dynam-
ically extend the state space of a cognitive system, so that it adds new
higher level state variables. Each time the state space is looked at, the
cognitive system can take the base variables from the simulator and ex-
tend them step by step with all abstractions found so far. This mechanism
may lay a foundation for future work on ongoing emergence by emulat-
ing Mandler’s mechanism of Perceptual Analysis [47]. Newly discovered
abstractions could be thought of as emergent symbolic elements in the
system. Our long term goal is to create a developmental AI system that
evolves from subsymbolic space to symbolic reasoning by finding/creating
symbols on its own.
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